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ABSTRACT
Whether city governments should intervene and provide public funds for building Municipal Wireless Networks (MWN) is a
controversial and important issue. Some people support the government’s intervention because MWN services seem to fit in
the “public goods” category and result in “positive externality” (Cornes and Sandler, 1986). However, others are suspicious
of the efficacy of the government’s intervention based on the competing New Institutional Economics (NIE) theory
(Williamson, 2000; Cheung, 2002).
Backed with the theoretical arguments of property rights and transaction costs, we critique the welfare economics policy
recommendation which calls for government interventions. We predict that city governments will contract with private firms
in developing MWN and will contribute city owned radio frequency and streetlights in the production of MWN services. Our
initial findings from an empirical study confirm this proposition. Our study contributes to the MIS research on the emerging
phenomenon by introducing NIE and provides practitioners with valid policy recommendations.
Keywords
Municipal Wireless Networks, New Institutional Economics, property rights, transaction costs.
INTRODUCTION
Universal broadband Internet access will help a country to gain a significant advantage in the global competition
(McChesney and Podesta, 2006). However, the United States is ranked 19th for household broadband penetration in the
world, according to Telecompaper, a research firm and publisher specializing in telecommunication and Internet news
(http://knowledge.wpcarey.asu.edu/index.cfm?fa=printArticle&ID=1183, 2006).
The characteristics of traditional wire network technology plus the density distribution of a community make certain areas
unattractive to major telecom and cable companies. Because wiring those communities is too expensive and not profitable,
these areas are left behind and are under served. Lacking access to high-speed Internet, some communities feel that they need
to plan and build broadband networks themselves (Behm, 2004).
New wireless network technology
New wireless network technology, Wireless Fidelity (Wi-Fi), presents an opportunity to deploy new broadband Internet
access services in areas previously viewed as unprofitable by traditional telecom and cable companies.
A Wi-Fi network is cheaper and easier to build compared to the traditionally wired network technology. While it might cost
traditional cable and DSL companies millions of dollars to bring broadband to all residents of Cerritos, California, the Wi-Fi
solution only costs tens of thousands. Moreover, it is easy to install a Wi-Fi network, unlike wired networks in which
expensive cables must be laid underground. Thus, a Wi-Fi network can be deployed quickly as the builder does not need to
dig underground to bury cables, according to Stan Hirschman, CEO of Wi-Fi start-up Aiirmesh (Kessler, 2004). Wi-Fi
networks are also easy to use by the end users, who only need a Wi-Fi compatible network adaptor card. Currently the price
of a Wi-Fi adaptor card is under $50.
Therefore, Wi-Fi technology is a viable technical choice for building a broadband network for under-served communities. In
the past few years, dozens of cities in the United States have jumped on the MWN bandwagon.
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Benefits of MWN
The exploding interest in creating Municipal Wireless Networks (MWN) indicates rationally expected benefits of MWN.
According to Philadelphia's Mayor John Street, the main motivation of a MWN project is to narrow the “digital divide” – the
gap between the fortunate ones who can afford high-speed Internet access and those low-income people who have no such
ability. Cities with MWN will attract more potential business investments, opportunities, and travelers. MWN will also
improve city workers’ productivity by making it possible for them to update information in the field, thus saving commuting
time (http://knowledge.wpcarey.asu.edu/index.cfm?fa=printArticle&ID=1167, 2006). Moreover, MWN will help to improve
city image to retain and attract young professionals (Johnson, 2006A;
http://knowledge.wpcarey.asu.edu/index.cfm?fa=printArticle&ID=1183, 2006). MWN could also facilitate local economic
expansion and aid disaster response for homeland security (Johnson, 2006B). MWN will support innovative social and
business applications (Mandviwalla and Jain, 2006). Another potential benefit of MWN is the ability to attract more tourists
who otherwise have to find a commercial location that provides Wi-Fi access (Miller, 2005).
Research issues
Emerging wireless technology and the new development of MWN initiatives provide exciting research opportunities for
academia to study the technology and the social, economical, legal, and political problems created by this new phenomenon.
The city government and its CIO both face technical and business decisions regarding building and operating MWN. Some of
the questions they face include:
· What kind of technical infrastructure should be used for developing MWN? What are the technical risks, given the
relative fast development of emerging wireless technology such as WiMax? What level of security should MWN
have?
· What is the viable business model for providing MWN?
· Will public funds be used for MWN? Will city governments finance MWN with taxes or through issuing MWN
bonds?
· Will the city government allow private firms to use the publicly owned radio spectrum and city owned street lights
in the MWN production? Will the city government earn some rents from the deal?
· Will the city government rely on the private sector to build, operate and maintain MWN?
· To what extent will the city government be involved in the MWN project?
· Overall, the bigger question is, what role will the city government play in the MWN project?
In the next section we will present theoretical backgrounds from the “public goods and positive externality” side as well as
from the “New Institutional Economics” side. We will then employ logical reasoning from the theoretical background to the
specific issue of MWN. Following the theoretical arguments, we will deduct a proposition and imply what will be observed
in the real world. Next, we will conduct several empirical case studies. We will discuss the findings in connection with the
above economic theory. Finally, we will conclude the paper and point out the limitations and future research directions.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Public goods
A public good is a good or service that is difficult to be provided profitably by private producers because it has two
properties: non-rivalry and non-excludable (Cowen, 1988; Goldin, 1977; Wessks, 2000; West, 2000). Non-rivalry or
jointness of consumption means one party’s consumption of the public good does not diminish another party’s consumption
of the same public good. Non-excludable means it is very hard or expensive to exclude the non-payer from access to the
public goods once it is produced and released. Examples of classic pure public goods include national defense, law
enforcement, and online database information (West, 2000).
Because it is expensive or impossible to exclude the non-payer from accessing and enjoying the public goods, the producer of
public goods will be under compensated. Thus, the producer of public goods has less incentive to produce the socially
optimal amount of public goods resulting the under production of the public goods. This leads to market failure and
inefficiency in resource allocation. The root reason is the existence of positive externality, that is, the private producer of the
public goods cannot fully receive all the benefits of the production (Flynn, 2005).
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Positive externality
When the producer of public goods cannot reap all of its gains from its action, positive externality occurs. Positive externality
is the uncollected benefit external to the producer. The free rider gets a spillover of benefits with no responsibility to pay.
Economics policy recommendation from public goods and externality literature
Traditional welfare economics believe when there is a divergence between private and social costs, the market fails and the
government should intervene (Pigou, 1920). Following this line of logic, Meade (1952) proposes an imaginary example of a
reciprocal externality problem – apples and bees. A bee-keeper gets benefits from her bees feeding on an apple blossom
without compensating the apple farmer. At the same time the reciprocal situation is that the bees fertilize the apples, and the
apple farmer does not compensate the beekeeper. Meade recommends imposing subsidies and taxes by government. The
“apples and bees” example along with Pigou’s polluting factory and Mill (1848) and Sidgwick (1883)’s lighthouse illustrate
the “externality” phenomena where government action is invited to rescue “market failure”.
Blaming the market’s inability to take externality into account, ideal Pigovian taxes are proposed to reduce market failure.
The amount of Pigovian taxes levied is set equal to the negative externality, and the amount of Pigovian subsidy imposed is
set equal to the positive externality.
Based on Cornes and Sandler’s work “Theory of externalities, public goods, and club goods” (1986), it is plausible for the
government to intervene to provide a service if the service uses public goods and has the prospect of generating substantial
positive externality.
New Institutional Economics
New Institutional Economics (NIE) originates from Coase (1937)’s fundamental insight of transaction cost. NIE emphasis the
role of transaction cost in determining the institutional arrangements and the performance of different economic structures.
Because of the corresponding transaction costs, some organizational choices are more efficient than others (Williamson,
2000; Cheung, 2002).
Property rights
Knight (1924) points out the fallacies in Pigou’s interpretation of the divergence between private and social costs. Knight
explains that it is not negative externality leading to market failure. Instead, the problem is that there is no private ownership
of the concerned resources. Establishing a private property right system will achieve the same economic efficiency as an ideal
government intervention.
Coase (1959) in his study of “Federal Communications Commission” contends that “the delineation of rights is an essential
prelude of market transactions.” Coase questions the entrenched belief that the resource of a publicly owned radio spectrum
should be allocated by government’s visible hand. Coase proposes that a market mechanism with a clearly defined private
property right may better serve the public interest by moving the resource to the hand that values the resource most.
Moreover, Coase (1959) shows that under the assumption of zero transaction cost, with the private property right system,
market exchange can direct resource allocation to reach the Pareto optimal condition with voluntary negotiation among
related parties, if they behave rationally.
In the paper “The Problem of Social Cost,” Coase (1960) exposits the reciprocal nature of the social cost problem. The Coase
theorem shows that surprisingly, under the same above assumptions, the matter of who has the property right over the
resource does not affect the final optimal resource allocation. This is the famous Invariance Theorem.
So the root causes of “market failure” and “externality” are the absence of exclusive property right, the lack of rights to make
contracts, or the incompleteness of the contract due to high transaction costs (Cheung, 1970).
Demsetz’s view on public goods
Demsetz (1970) shows that when a nonpayer of public goods can be excluded, private producers can efficiently produce
public goods. When the costs of exclusion are very high, there are some devices to further private production of such
“collective goods.” The private provider may tie in the consumption of a second product with the consumption of the
collective goods. Because it is possible to exclude the second product, the private provider may have the incentive to produce
the tie-in goods. Commercial advertisers and manufacturers of radio and television could tie in the commercial ads with the
public goods of broadcasting (Demsetz, 1970).
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Transaction costs
Market mechanism and the firm’s visible hand are different ways to organize production and allocate resources (Coase,
1937). There are costs associated with the exchange of goods on the marketplace and the maintenance of control over the use
of resources even without transaction (Demsetz, 1964). The Pigouan tradition compares the actual market arrangement when
there is “externality” with imaginary ideal government intervention. This kind of comparison commits the “grass is greener”
fallacy (Demsetz, 1969). The relevant comparison of institutional arrangement is between transactions costs of actual market
mechanism and transactions costs of realizable government intervention, given the same effects of an action (Cheung, 1970).
One has to consider the costs associated with institutions before reaching the final decision on the institutional choice.
(Coase, 1960).
The ideal Pigovian tax or subsidy only exist in the imaginary world. In reality, there are enormous information cost problems
in determining the optimal level of the ideal Pigovian tax or subsidy. Identifying, measuring externality, and enforcing
Pigovian tax or subsidy present substantial difficulty to the government. The resources spent on correcting positive
externality may well cost more than their intended gains.
THEORETICAL APPLICATIONS ON MWN
After presenting the economic theories from both sides, in this section we apply critical theoretical reasoning to the MWN
problem. We challenge the welfare economics’ policy recommendation of government intervention. Utilizing the tools of
property rights and transaction costs, we conjecture the institutional arrangements of MWN production. We deduct a
proposition that city government can contract with private firms in providing MWN.
“Public goods” and “positive externality” doctrine
From the “public goods” and “positive externality” doctrine, MWN utilizes the publicly owned radio spectrum and city
owned streetlights, which are considered public goods. Moreover, the MWN services are public goods and the corresponding
significant positive externality may dictate it is in the best interest of the public to let city government intervene and provide
the MWN services.
Lenses of New Institutional Economics
Our critique of MWN as “public goods”
MWN will employ the publicly owned radio spectrum. Radio spectrum is not a public good because it has the properties of
rivalry and excludability. Within a certain geographical range, two individuals using the same radio frequency will interfere
with each other. In fact, this is the exact reason the Federal Communications Commission’s precursor— the Federal Radio
Commission--was instituted: to regulate the frequency and establish the order in radio airwave (Coase, 1959). The publicly
owned radio frequency can be licensed to a private party through auction. The highest bidder acquires certain property rights
over the licensed frequency (McGuigan, Moyer and Harris, 2005). Thus the licensee is protected under the law. If a third
party violates the licensee’s right over the frequency, the licensee can seek legal action against the offender in the court.
Thus, the publicly owned radio spectrum is not a public good, and it can be exchanged on the market.
MWN services are not public goods. Just like other broadband Internet access services, the service is excludable for non-
payers. The right to access MWN can be technically protected with an account and password. Without an account and
password, a non-payer cannot access MWN.
City owned street lights are relatively more close to “public goods” in nature, since they are both non-rivalry and non-
excludable property. City governments finance the street lights services through levying taxes.
Like online database information, MWN services can be non-rivalry when there are no crowding effects (West, 2000).
Because technically MWN service is excludable to non-payers and it has non-rivalry property, it is a club good (Cornes and
Sandler, 1986). Thus, it can be provided by a private firm.
Our critique of MWN’s positive externality
Laissez-faire economists such as Milton Friedman and Friedrich von Hayek talk about externalities as "neighborhood effects"
or "spillovers.” Positive extremity is a “free lunch” at no cost to the unintended beneficiary
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Externality, 2006).
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According to NIE, positive externality exists because the property rights are poorly defined or the transaction costs are too
high (Cheung, 2002).  The transactions costs in the context of MWN include costs of identifying who are the “free riders”,
measuring the magnitude of the “side effects” and enforcing the property rights by collecting money form the “free riders”.
We model the provision, operation, and maintenance of Municipal Wireless Networks as a standard production process. City
government can provide property rights over radio frequency and streetlights in MWN production. Private firms can rent the
city properties and combine the firm’s capitals, labors, knowledge, and expertise in MWN productions. Owning property
rights  for  radio  frequency  and  streetlights  does  not  mean  the  city  government  has  to  be  the  MWN  owner  because  the
government can surrender a delimited set of usage rights over its property to the private firm, while still keeps the
excludability rights. Such separation of excludability rights from usability rights is shown as possible in IT outsourcing
contracts (Walden, 2005).
If the property rights of MWN contributors are clearly defined and accounted for when sharing revenues, there will be no
positive externality. The benefits they get are just a return on investments and rents. The possible positive externality will be
appropriated  by  the  existing  local  community,  who  are  not  payers  of  MWN  services  and  do  not  contribute  to  the  MWN
production. They may get the spillover benefits because the city now attracts more business and residents. To correct positive
externality, transaction costs and information costs may be too high for the government to intervene.
Without government’s intervention, there might be some private solutions. Free market can operate in a sub-optimal state
rather than ideal efficient market (West, 2000). Some innovative institutional arrangements will reduce transaction costs and
mitigate the market failure.
Therefore, based on the above analysis from NIE’s perspective, we have deducted the following proposition:
Proposition 1: City governments will contract with private firms in MWN production. Private firms will own, finance,
operate, and maintain the MWNs. City governments will not subsidize MWNs with public funds.
This proposition implies that in the real world:
· We expect to observe private firms will acquire the usage rights of city owned radio spectrum and streetlights.
· We expect to observe city governments will receive rents from private firms by letting them use the city’s property.
· We expect to observe city governments will not use public funds to finance MWN. More specifically we expect the
city governments will not finance MWN from public funds--either taxes or newly issued city government MWN
bonds.
· Moreover, we expect to find private firms that build, operate and maintain the MWN.
· We will not expect to see city governments use public funds to purchase Wi-Fi equipments, such as wireless routers,
wireless broadcasting tower, antenna, transmitters, and access points.
· We will not expect to see city governments use public funds to hire Wi-Fi specialists.
· If a city government chooses to let the private sector provide MWN services, we will not expect to see net cash
flowing out of city government for MWN, and we will expect to see some revenue coming into city government
from MWN project.
· We expect to see city government detach the usage rights of city property from the exclusive rights.  More
specifically we expect the city governments allow a private firm to rent city’s property, but not make the deal
exclusive in the MWN production.
EMPIRICAL CASE STUDIES
To test our proposition conjectured in the last section, we conducted multi-case studies. We collected secondary data from the
following Internet websites:
· http://www.usatoday.com/tech/front.htm USA Today
· http://knowledge.wpcarey.asu.edu/ ASU Knowledge W. P. Carey
· http://www.eweek.com/ eWeek
· http://www.jsonline.com/ Milwaukee Journal Sentinel
We have monitored the above websites since 2003. We collected and stored any articles related to Wi-Fi and community
based broadband network in a digital repository. Then we performed content analysis against these collected articles. We paid
special attention to the articles reporting MWN initiatives. We examined those articles carefully with the economic theories
in mind. We investigated the business models, contractual arrangements, and organization forms of these MWN initiatives.
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We chose the following cases to report here because they have relatively complete coverage of the artifacts of our interest.
We will discuss the cases in regard to NIE theory and test our proposition against these facts.
Case 1: Philadelphia, PA
The city of Philadelphia established a partnership with Earthlink and created a nonprofit corporation, Wireless Philadelphia.
Earthlink finances the MWN’s infrastructure. Earthlink officially owns the network, thus exempting the city from the state
bill banning MWN. The access points or receivers will be installed on city-owned streetlights. The monthly subscription fee
for users is $20, while $10 for lower-income household. It will charge about $50 to $60 per month for premium business
service with higher speeds. The Wi-Fi services will cover 135 square miles. Tropos Networks is the company in charge of
Wi-Fi hardware in the deployment. Moreover the MWN will secure a licensed radio frequency in the airwave. The MWN
will save the city government $2 million in Internet access fee now being paid to a commercial ISP, according to the CIO of
Philidaphia, PA (Epstein, 2005; http://knowledge.wpcarey.asu.edu/index.cfm?fa=printArticle&ID=1167, 2006; Mandviwalla
and Jain, 2006; Nobel, 2006).
Case 2: Tempe, AZ
The city of Tempe relies on a private firm, NeoReach Wireless, a subsidiary of broadband provider MobilePro Corp., to
deploy and maintain the WAZTempe network. NeoReach owns the MWN and has signed a five-year definitive agreement
with the city. The city of Tempe then selects Strix Systems Inc., a player in the wireless mesh market, to provide the
network’s underlying technology. The monthly subscription fee for users is $30. The MWN services will be freely available
to city departments and available to the local residents and businesses at a reduced subscription fee. The WAZTempe
network will cover 40 square miles (Johnson, 2005; http://knowledge.wpcarey.asu.edu/index.cfm?fa=printArticle&ID=1183,
2006; http://waztempe.com/, 2006).
Case 3: Cerritos, California
Wi-Fi start-up Aiirmesh financed, built, and owns the MWN covering the whole city, more than 8 squares miles. The city
officials helped in the MWN project. Cerritos allowed Aiirmesh to have access to the city owned facilities such as buildings,
traffic lights, and streetlights, so Aiirmesh could place antennas on these properties. Moreover, Aiirmesh can use the
electricity power at those sites. The MWN charges users $30 per month to access the entire Internet, while viewing city
websites is free. Cerritos agreed to buy 60 subscriptions to the service for its city workers. Cerritos is open to other
competing firms to provide Wi-Fi services by allowing them to place their antennas on Cerritos’s traffic lights and buildings.
Cerritos wants Aiirmesh to makes money because if Aiirmesh does not profit, it will pull out and leave Cerritos without
Internet access (Kessler, 2004).
Case 4: Milwaukee, WI
The city of Milwaukee and Midwest Fiber Networks reached an agreement to create a $20 million MWN at no cost to its
taxpayers. EarthLink, among others, will be the anchor ISP on the MWN. Users of the MWN will pay $20 monthly fee for
complete access to the Internet. However, access to 60 city selected websites on the MWN is free. Milwaukee will allow
Midwest Fiber Networks to use the city-owned underground conduit system to run fiber-optic cables and use streetlights to
deploy antennas. Midwest Fiber Networks will build the infrastructure and run the system. Midwest Fiber Networks will
make a one time payment of $150,000 to the city’s “digital divide” fund. The city will get 400 free MWN accounts worth
$100,000 a year and 60 city selected websites worth $300,000 a year. Moreover, the city will receive 1% gross revenue from
years four to year six, and 3% in years seven to fourteen. Because the future annual payment is a share of the total revenue,
the city hopes the MWN is successful and makes more money. The agreement lasts for 14 years with an option to continue
for another six years. Both parties can revisit details every three years and a mediator will deal with any future disputes. The
city reserves the right to allow other firms to create their own systems on similar terms with the city. Moreover, Midwest
Fiber Networks’s system will be open to other firms, not just EarthLink, to provide services to subscribers (Borowski, 2006).
Case 5: Waukesha, WI
The city of Waukesha entered into discussion with Cellnet Technology Inc. of Alpharetta, Ga. about MWN. The potential
deal will not cost taxpayers money. The city could earn money on the deal by letting Cellnet lease space on streetlights and
other local government property. Like Milwaukee’s deal with Midwest Fiber Networks, Cellnet will not provide Internet
access to the users but will create a network through which ISPs can operate. Cellnet’s deal is not exclusive because the city
does not want to limit itself to just one vendor (Epstein, 2006).
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City, State Use
taxes
?
Owner Deploy
maintain
City input
property
Monthly
user fee
City benefits Non-
exclusive
deal?
Size
square
miles
Philadelphia,
PA
No Broadband
provider
Wi-Fi firm streetlights,
licensed
frequency
$20 save $2
million
N/A 135
Tempe, AZ No Broadband
provider
Broadband
provider
N/A $30 free city
department
accounts and
city websites
N/A 40
Cerritos,
California
No Wi-Fi firm Wi-Fi firm streetlights,
buildings,
traffic lights
$30 free city
websites but
buy 60
accounts
Yes 8
Milwaukee,
WI
No Wi-Fi firm Wi-Fi firm conduit
system,
streetlights
$20 400 free
account and 60
free websites,
annual
payments
Yes N/A
Waukesha,
WI
No Wi-Fi firm Wi-Fi firm streetlights N/A could earn
money
Yes N/A
Table 1. Summary of Findings
Discussion
From the above five cases, we observe some consistent themes. All city governments contract with private firms in providing
MWN services. None of the cities own or finance the MWN with taxes. We do not find any city that issues bonds to finance
the MWN project.  None of the cities build and operate the MWN. Private firms own, finance, deploy, and manage all the
MWNs. We find city governments collaborate with private businesses by forming partnerships or jointly creating non-profit
organizations. Most MWNs’ service plans include a monthly subscription fee that varies based on the level of services. We
observe most cities contribute to the MWN projects by surrendering the usage property rights over their streetlights, radio
frequency, buildings, and other facilities to the private firms. In return, the city governments get benefits of free MWN
accounts, city selected websites available free on MWN, savings on ISP fees, and even future annual share of gross avenue.
We find some cities explicitly reserve the rights to contract with other firms in the future, so the deals are not exclusive.
Overall these findings confirm our proposition and its implications.
Moreover, we discover some interesting facts from the above cases. Some city governments explicitly express the wish that
the private firms can make more money in MWN services. The rationales for the city governments are:
· In the case of sharing future gross revenue, the bigger the total revenue, the more money the government can
receive.
· In the case of a small city, if the private MWN firm cannot earn a profit, the firm will pull out of the region and
leave the city without Internet access.
On the other hand, some city governments do bargain aggressively with private firms on contract terms to get as much as
they can.
In most cases, we see more than one private firm involved in the provision of MWN. Usually a broadband provider and a Wi-
Fi technical firm work together. Moreover, more than one ISP provides access services over the MWN platform to the end
users.
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CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATION, AND FUTURE WORK
Overall, our empirical study supports our proposition. We conclude that most city governments can contribute their property
rights over city owned streetlights, buildings, and publicly owned radio frequency to the production of MWN. Furthermore,
no public funds–either taxes or issued bonds--are found in all the cases. Most MWN are deployed and maintained by private
firms, either broadband provider or Wi-Fi firms. Taking these evidences together with the theoretical prediction of NIE, we
tend to conclude that city government does not need to finance, build, and maintain MWN. Instead, it can contribute to MWN
by donating its property rights and work with the private firms. In the best interest of the public, city governments do not
need  to  intervene  in  the  production  of  MWN,  neither  by  the  city  government  itself  producing  MWN  nor  by  imposing  a
subsidy to private firms.
In sum, the NIE theory generates helpful explanations of the business model, contractual arrangement, and organization
structure choice for MWN.
The primary limitation of this paper is that we only relied on limited secondary data. By extending this study and examining
more samples and tracking them over time, we may further test the findings and generalize our conclusion. On the theoretical
front, we may extend this research by considering other constructs that may influence the institutional arraignments of MWN.
These factors may include: MWN governance structure, contract issues, social costs, collective actions, commons
(Damsgaard, Parikh and Rao, 2006), and corruptions.
Although above five empirical cases support NIE prediction, our ongoing research does come across a counter example. A
local community utilizes public funds to build MWN, when no private firm wants to help. Rural Nevada, Mo. spent $20,000
to build a MWN, covering 8 squares miles, and it costs residents about $30 per month (Kessler, 2004). We acknowledge
there might be situations that it is more efficient to let the city government provide MWN.  Maybe the scale of economy and
demand of MWN services play some roles in attracting private firms to invest in MWN. However, before further empirical
study, this is only our conjecture. Moreover, we find some cities provide free MWN services with limited scope and degree
(Miller, 2003). We also find some grassroots MWN movement initiatives in which individuals collaborate with each other to
form collective actions to advance their ideology and cause (Moore, 2005; Schmidt and Townsend, 2003;
http://mobile.ithub.com/blogs/mobile/archive/2006/02/02/5480.aspx, 2006). Will these emerging trends be just marginally
relevant or are they equally important as a MWN institutional arrangement co-existing with the ones presented in the paper?
It seems future empirical research on MWN institutional arrangement will be fruitful in both extending our theoretical
understanding of NIE in the context of MWN, and generating useful policy recommendations to city governments and city
CIOs.
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